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takes the Trade and Development Bank (TDB), an MDB in Africa with 22 regional member countries,
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interviews with management and shareholders, the author finds that borrower‐led governance leads to
substantial disadvantages in terms of access to finance. Borrower‐led governance permits TDB and other
MnDBs greater operational flexibility, which partially compensates for this financial disadvantage, but
these operational strategies come with trade‐offs in terms of developmental effectiveness. The findings
suggest that MnDBs have substantial latent potential and, in an increasingly multipolar world, they are
likely to grow in coming years. However, MnDBs need to ensure that their developmental value added is
strengthened in step with their financial power.
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Multilateral development banks (MDBs) are one of the most popular forms of international 
organization, with at least 28 operating in the world today. Although most academics and 
policy makers focus on the World Bank and major regional MDBs, the majority of MDBs are 
in fact relatively small, and controlled by developing as opposed to industrialized countries. 
How does the differing governance arrangements of these ‘minilateral’ development banks 
(MnDBs) impact their operations? This article takes the Trade and Development Bank, an 
MDB in Africa with 22 country shareholders, as a case study to consider this question. Based 
on an analysis of its track record since 2005 and interviews with management and 
shareholders, the author finds that borrower-led governance leads to substantial 
disadvantages in terms of access to finance. Borrower-led governance permits TDB and other 
MnDBs greater operational flexibility, which partially compensates for this financial 
disadvantage, but these operational strategies come with trade-offs in terms of developmental 
effectiveness. The findings suggest that MnDBs have substantial latent potential and, in an 
increasingly multipolar world, they are likely to grow in coming years. However, MnDBs 
need to ensure that their developmental value added strengthens in step with their financial 
power.  
 
The research for this article was made possible with a grant from the Swiss National Science 
Foundation. The author would like to thank Katharina Michaelowa of the University of Zurich and 
Kevin Gallagher of Boston University for their support, as well as the interview subjects for 






Of the myriad forms of international organizations that have proliferated since the second 
half of the 20th century, multilateral development banks (MDBs) have proven particularly 
popular. Following the founding of the World Bank in 1944, at least 28 MDBs now operate 
(see Appendix Table A1). Judging by the recent creation of the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank and New Development Bank, MDBs appears to have continued relevance in 
global development finance.  
 
Most academic and popular attention to date has focused on the World Bank and the major 
regional MDBs — the African Development Bank (AfDB), Asian Development Bank 
(AsDB), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB).1 This is no surprise, given their size, influence in global 
development and geopolitical role. It is difficult to think of the World Bank Group, with an 
outstanding portfolio of over US$ 350 billion,2 as comparable with the East African 
Development Bank (EADB), with a loan portfolio nearly 2,000 times smaller. Despite their 
vast disparity in scale, all MDBs follow the same basic blueprint: they are created by a group 
of like-minded countries who contribute share capital and own the MDBs; they borrow 
money from external sources (often private investors); and they on-lend that money for 
development projects in some or all of their member countries.  
 
In absolute numbers, most MDBs are actually more like the EADB than the World Bank. Not 
only are they for the most part quite small, but they are also mostly controlled by the same 
countries in which they operate — unlike the larger MDBs which are mainly controlled by 
non-borrower, industrialized countries3 (Figures 1 and 2). Africa has five borrower-led 
																																																								
1
 The literature on MDBs is vast, but a few key works to mention include Babb (2009) on the role of 
the USA as shareholder; Culpeper (1997) and Griffith-Jones et al. (2008) on regional MDBs); IDS 
(2001) on MDBs as a system; Kapur et al. (1997) on the World Bank; Kellerman (2018) on the 
proliferation of MDBs generally; Tussie (1995) on the IDB; Woods (2006) on the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund (IMF).  
2
 Including all four main financing windows of the World Bank Group. 
3
 Borrower countries formally have a majority of voting power at the AfDB and IDB, but this power 
is limited due to (1) the extreme dependence of AfDB on concessional resources donated by wealthy 
shareholders and (2) the formal veto power of the USA over key decisions at the IDB.  
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MDBs — more than any other continent — the largest of which is the Trade and 
Development Bank (TDB) (Table 1).  
 
[Figure 1; Figure 2; and Table 1]  
 
For want of a better term, this article labels these institutions ‘minilateral development banks’ 
(MnDBs), which refers to MDBs that were created and are still run by developing countries 
themselves, and are generally smaller in size compared to the World Bank and major regional 
MDBs. The term is inexact, as the Development Bank of Latin America (CAF) is nearly as 
large as the AfDB in terms of assets, and several other of these MnDBs are growing quickly. 
However, while acknowledging its limitations, MnDB is a useful shorthand for the type of 
organization analysed here.  
 
This article argues that despite their relatively modest size, MnDBs are highly relevant in 
both academic and policy terms.  
• In academic terms, MnDBs provide a useful lens for considering the governance of 
multilateral organizations — a topic of considerable scholarly attention, but mainly in 
relation to organizations dominated by industrialized countries.4 How does 
governance control by mainly borrower country shareholders impact MnDB 
characteristics and activities, and does this differ systematically from MDBs 
controlled by non-borrowers? This continues my earlier research that focused on 
MDBs in Latin America (Humphrey, 2014, 2015a, 2016) and is in line with other 
scholars (for example, Copelovitch, 2010; Lyne et al., 2009) who look at governance 
influence in international organizations beyond the role of a single powerful 
shareholder. This topic is becoming increasingly relevant in a geopolitical context in 
which the power of the USA and G7 has been steadily eroding. 
• In development policy terms, many MnDBs have begun growing rapidly after years of 
relative dormancy. One — the Development Bank of Latin America (CAF) — has 
expanded very dramatically, suggesting that other MnDBs could also have 
																																																								
4
 For studies of MDBs focusing on the role of a few powerful shareholders, see among many 
examples, Babb (2009); Dreher and Vreeland (2014); Kersting and Kilby (2016); Krasner (1981); 
Woods (2006).  
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considerable growth potential. Their control by developing countries may play a role 
in this, as the post-war global governance order begins to fragment and developing 
countries take greater control of their own development trajectories, and as financial 
globalization offers improved access to resources. With a better understanding of the 
challenges and opportunities facing MnDBs, policy makers can more usefully 
incorporate them into the international development finance architecture to play a role 
in the global development agenda. 
 
This article takes as a case study the TDB, the largest borrower-led MnDB in Africa, which 
currently has 22 members.5 An MnDB in Africa was chosen because of the overwhelming 
importance of development finance in the region, given its high development needs and 
relatively lower flows of private external finance (compared to Latin America or Asia, for 
example). Should the five MnDBs in Africa be able to provide substantially more 
development finance, it would be a valuable contribution to addressing the continent’s 
tremendous needs. From the five African MnDBs, TDB was chosen because of its very 
strong recent growth trajectory, which may offer lessons for other MnDBs. Some examples 
and data from MnDBs in other regions are occasionally included for comparative purposes 
and to enrich the discussion.   
 
The principal research questions considered by the article are: 
o How does the borrower-led governance of TDB and other MnDBs shape their ability 
to undertake their development mission, compared to the World Bank and major 
regional MDBs? 
o What explains TDB’s impressive recent lending growth, in light of the obstacles it 
faces due to its membership structure and operating environment? 





 Borrower country shareholders are: Burundi, Comoros, DR Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, 




The evidence presented below is the result of a detailed examination of TDB’s financial 
performance and lending activities since 2005 (the earliest year for which information is 
available), compared to similar data from other MDBs. I also carried out a detailed review of 
TDB annual reports, background documents and credit rating agency reports, and undertook 
a series of interviews with current and former TDB senior management in the period 
February to June 2017 (see Appendix Table A2 for a complete list of interviews).  
 
Following this introduction, the next section briefly traces the historical trajectory of TDB 
and outlines its governance set-up. The subsequent two sections then look at the challenges 
facing TDB in accessing finance, and consider its operational innovations for addressing 
those challenges. The concluding section draws together the main findings.  
 
 
BACKGROUND TO MNDBs IN AFRICA AND THE CREATION OF TDB 
 
It may come as a surprise that Africa has more ‘home-grown’ multilateral development banks 
than any other continent. The impetus for the burst of MDB creation derived initially from 
the desire of newly independent African nations in the 1960s and 1970s to stimulate rapid 
economic growth and industrialization through regional economic integration. The United 
Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) played an important role, encouraging 
African nations to create the AfDB in 1963 (Mingst, 1990; Mwale, 2001; UNECA, 2017), 
and subsequently designing a series of regional trade agreements across the continent. Linked 
to these trade agreements, a number of MnDBs were formed to help finance regional 
integration projects.6 Although the original trade and regional integration agreements were 
(and are) by and large ineffective (see among others Kimbugwe et al., 2012), the MnDBs for 




 Similarly, three MnDBs were created in Latin America during this period, also linked to regional 
integration agreements: CAF, the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI) and the 
Caribbean Development Bank (CDB). 
7
 A sixth African MnDB, the Development Bank of the Great Lakes States, was founded in 1977 but 




The Preferential Trade Agreement of Eastern and Southern Africa, signed in 1981, was the 
last of the regional integration agreements deriving from the initial push by UNECA and the 
Lagos Plan of Action (UNECA, 2017). After a delay of four years, the Trade and 
Development Bank, TDB — originally called PTA Bank due to its formal link to the trade 
agreement8 — was launched in 1985. TDB operated on a very modest scale for the first 15 
years of its existence. By 1999, the bank had a small portfolio, a very high stock of non-
performing loans (NPL) and substantial difficulties in finding projects to fund due to the 
moribund state of regional trade and lack of interest by borrowers. Starting in 2000, TDB 
launched a series of reforms that paved the way for its subsequent growth trajectory. 
 
TDB currently has 22 member countries plus a group of institutional shareholders, grouped 
into two shareholding classes (see below for details). No individual member country is 
permitted to have more than 15 per cent of total voting shares (TDB, 2016: Article 6), and 
currently no member has more than 9 per cent (TDB, 2016 Financial Statement). As a result, 
no member has even close to veto power in the boards of governors or directors,9 which 
generally require a simple majority — or, in special cases, a two-thirds majority — for 
decision making. This has led to a relatively harmonious environment on the board where, 
according to senior management, most issues are decided by consensus. ‘Everybody is a 
minority, there’s no tail that can wag the dog here’, said TDB President Tadesse. ‘So that 
creates a very different kind of environment [from the larger MDBs], and people behave with 
the best interests of the institution in mind’.10  
 
TDB remains substantially smaller than the main lending window of the World Bank (IBRD) 
as well as the major regional MDBs, as measured by both outstanding loan portfolio and 
annual lending commitments. However, it is far larger than any other MnDB in Africa, 
approaching the scale of the two main borrower-run MnDBs in Latin America, CAF and 
																																																								
8
 The bank was renamed TDB in spring 2017. To avoid confusion, this article uses the name TDB 
throughout. 
9
 As with most MDBs, the Board of Governors meets once a year. The Board of Directors meets 
semi-regularly, but does not sit in permanent session as at the World Bank and major regional MDBs. 
The Board of Directors is comprised of 10 directors plus the president: five directors represent groups 
of three African countries; one director represents non-regional countries; one director represents the 
AfDB as shareholder; one director represents non-sovereign shareholders; and two directors are 
independent.  
10
 Interview, Admasse Tadesse, TDB President, 16 May 2017. 
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CABEI (see Table A1), and its financial performance has improved dramatically in recent 
years. The size of the loan portfolio rose over 1000 per cent in the decade prior to 2015, from 




According to interviews with the current and former TDB presidents11 and a review of annual 
reports, the impetus for TDB’s impressive growth came from a very poor financial 
performance in the late 1990s, followed by shareholder insistence on internal reforms. The 
bank has benefited from strong leadership that gained the support of shareholders, as has also 
been the case for CAF (Rubio, 2015). More broadly, it would seem that TDB, like CAF 
before it (Humphrey, 2016; Rubio, 2015) and several other MnDBs more recently,12 have 
begun to realize the potential of their institutions, and in particular, their ability to access 
bond markets. The drive to access bond market — rather than borrow from commercial banks 
or bilateral donors — has been the goal orienting many of the reforms implemented by TDB 
in recent years, as will be demonstrated below.  
 
 
ACCESSING FINANCE: THE MAIN OBSTACLE FOR MNDBs 
 
The chief attraction of MDBs is their core financial model. Member countries contribute a 
limited amount of shareholding capital to found an MDB, and the MDB then mainly pays for 
itself by lending resources for development projects at financial terms sufficiently low to be 
useful to the borrower, but at a mark-up to cover MDB administrative costs. Further 
contributions from member countries are only required to either increase the MDB’s capacity 
or create funds for special purposes like helping the poorest countries.13  
																																																								
11
 Admasse Tadesse, TDB President, 16 May 2017, and Michael Gondwe, former TDB President, 22 
February 2017. 
12
 Several MnDBs have received their first international bond rating in recent years, including Black 
Sea Trade and Development Bank, West African Development Bank, East African Development 
Bank, Eurasian Development Bank, and even the Soviet-era International Investment Bank.  
13
 While most special funds are quite small, they can be substantial. For example, the World Bank’s 
International Development Association (IDA) has a loan portfolio almost as large as the Bank’s 




For this model to function, an MDB has to have access to funding. MDBs do not take 
deposits,14 which means they have to borrow most of the resources they on-lend for 
development projects. MDBs need to access resources at sufficiently attractive terms to be 
able to on-lend to borrowers at rates they can afford, while still charging a margin that pays 
for the bank’s own administrative costs. For large MDBs, this is no problem. In fiscal year 
2016 alone, the World Bank’s main lending window (IBRD) issued US$ 63 billion in bonds 
in 21 different currencies, at a weighted average borrowing cost of 0.8 per cent — lower than 
almost all governments in the world (World Bank, 2016a: 28–30).  
 
The key reason for the stellar access of the World Bank and major regional MDBs to 
international capital markets is an AAA bond rating. The factors shaping bond ratings of 
MDBs are too complex to discuss in detail here,15 but boil down to a few key issues, foremost 
among them the membership and support of many of the largest and wealthiest countries in 
the world. The backing of rich countries — mainly in the form of ‘callable capital’, a type of 
financial guarantee — gives bond investors additional confidence that MDBs are financially 
safe.  
 
Compared to the World Bank and major regional MDBs, the countries providing callable 
capital to TDB look far less secure. TDB’s weighted average shareholder rating is only B- — 
nine notches below the IBRD’s A- average rating and five notches below the AfDB’s BB+ 
rating. Furthermore, the vast majority of TDB’s capital — nearly 90 per cent — is below 
investment grade or not rated at all, while only 10 per cent is above investment grade. This is 
a major obstacle for MnDBs in general, and especially for MnDBs in Africa compared to less 
poor regions like Latin America. Two MnDBs in Latin America, CAF and CABEI, have 
average shareholder ratings of BB — substantially higher than TDB. As Moody’s 2015 
report noted, ‘Many of [TDB’s] shareholders are heavily reliant on foreign aid for a large 
portion of their foreign currency needs. As a result of these considerations, the ability of these 
																																																								
14
 Except in very rare cases. For example, CAF does take some deposits from member country central 
banks, but these form a minimal proportion of CAF’s liabilities.  
15
 For more, see the ratings agency methodologies (Fitch, 2017; Moody’s, 2017; S&P, 2017) as well 
as Humphrey (2017).  
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member governments to quickly transfer the callable capital to the bank in the hypothetical 
event of an emergency is very low’ (Moody’s, 2015: 15). 
 
A second issue of great importance to credit rating agencies is an MDB’s capital adequacy — 
the size and quality of its loan portfolio in relation to a bank’s own capital. Here again, TDB 
faces substantial difficulties. On the side of shareholder capital, the fiscal limitations of TDB 
member country governments make it difficult to capitalize the bank, limiting its financial 
capacity. TDB members have been able to contribute only a very small amount of paid-in 
capital (Figure 4) — a fraction of that paid into the major MDBs, and far less than the Latin 




TDB’s portfolio is also substantially riskier than the major MDBs. Several of TDB’s member 
countries are among the poorest nations in the world, and the average GDP per capita of its 
borrower members is US$ 4,921, far below the level of the larger MDBs and also well below 
CAF and CABEI (Figure 5). Of TDB’s 20 borrower members, 13 were included in the 
HIPC/MDRI debt relief initiatives,16 and three (Somalia, Sudan and Zimbabwe) are virtual 
pariahs from international financial markets. Further, a substantial sub-set of TDB’s member 
countries are currently or have recently undergone full-scale civil war or very serious 
political turbulence. As a result, TDB’s portfolio is highly concentrated among very risky 
borrowers. Moody’s notes, ‘[TDB’s] activities expose it to significant credit risk due to the 
economically weak and politically challenging regional operating environment’ (Moody’s, 
2015 1). This is borne out by a much higher level of NPL than other MDBs: an average of 10 
per cent of the total TDB loan portfolio over 2005–2015, compared to 0.0–0.4 per cent for the 






 The Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative for Highly Indebted Poor Countries ‘allows for 100 percent 
relief on eligible debts by three multilateral institutions  — the IMF, the World Bank, and the African 
Development Fund (AfDF) — for countries completing the HIPC Initiative process’ (IMF, 2018). 
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TDB’s bond rating in late 2017 was only Ba1 for Moody’s and BB for Fitch — a full 
seven/eight notches below CAF’s bond rating by the same agencies, and 10 and 11 notches, 
respectively, below an AAA rating. This means TDB has a much more difficult time 
accessing financing on reasonable terms from bond markets and commercial banks. With 
high funding costs, the financial terms of TDB loans to borrowers are also substantially more 
expensive than the major MDBs (Figure 6): 7–8 per cent on average, compared to 3–4 per 
cent for AfDB and 1–2 per cent for the World Bank (IBRD). Not only are the interest rates on 
loans much higher, but the average length of loan maturities are much lower: only one-third 
of TDB’s outstanding loans are for longer than three years (TDB, 2016), compared to, for 
example, nearly three-quarters (71.5 per cent) for both AfDB and World Bank17 (AfDB, 
2016; IBRD, 2016). From the point of view of borrowers, TDB’s loans are much less useful 
for development projects, especially long-term projects like infrastructure, because they are 




In summary, TDB faces a number of serious obstacles to accessing the resources it needs to 
be able to provide useful development financing services to its member countries, compared 
to the World Bank and larger regional MDBs. These obstacles are a direct function of its 
membership: 20 African countries, most of which are very poor and many of which are 
politically fragile, control nearly 90 per cent of the bank’s shares and voting power. Building 
an MnDB dominated by borrower countries has a strong appeal to developing nations, as an 
expression of independence and a desire to diversify funding options. But this approach poses 
a unique set of challenges to the core financial model that underpins all MDBs, as TDB and 
other MnDBs have found.  
 
 
MEMBERSHIP EXPANSION AND OPERATIONAL FLEXIBILITY: TDB’S 




 IBRD’s portfolio is 71.5 per cent over four years, hence the number would be higher for over three 
years. However IBRD does not report the three-year data.  
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This section explores the strategies TDB has followed that have allowed it to become a useful 
financial intermediary to its member countries, the way its governance characteristics have 
shaped its ability to adapt operations, and some of the trade-offs of TDB’s approach 





In light of the substantial challenges posed by TDB’s membership, it is unsurprising that 
reforms to the ownership structure have been a high priority. Since 2000, management has 
pushed to expand TDB’s membership to new countries, for three principal reasons: (1) to 
strengthen the bank’s capital base and hence lending capacity; (2) to bring in new borrowing 
countries to diversify and de-risk the loan portfolio; and (3) to bring in shareholders with 
higher sovereign ratings to strengthen TDB’s own credit rating. Originally founded with nine 
members, TDB now has 22 sovereign shareholders and 10 institutional shareholders. This 
membership expansion has occurred among three main classes of shareholder.  
 
The most substantial growth in membership has been with borrower country governments. 
TDB was originally created as an offshoot of the Preferential Trade Agreement, which 
subsequently became the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); 
bank membership was initially limited to COMESA members. TDB’s early efforts focused 
on bringing all COMESA members in as TDB shareholders, a process which is now complete 
with the exception of Libya. In 2012, shareholders agreed to reform TDB’s Charter to allow 
not only COMESA members, but all members of various trade agreements in southern and 
eastern Africa, as well as any neighbouring states. This modification allowed TDB to agree 
membership with Mozambique, and it has entered negotiations with Algeria, Angola, 
Botswana, Namibia and Tunisia18 — all of which would substantially improve the average 





 Personal communication, TDB President Tadesse.  
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TDB has also attempted to attract non-borrower country government shareholders to 
strengthen TDB’s bond rating. China was the first and remains the only substantial non-
borrowing country19 to join TDB, buying shares in 2000 and, as of end-2016, owning 6.2 per 
cent of the bank’s total shares. China’s inclusion has worked very well for TDB by increasing 
paid-in capital and supporting the bank’s bond rating. Including wealthier nations like 
German, France and Sweden in the bank’s capital would be much more helpful in this regard, 
and management continues to actively seek new OECD members.20 TDB is clear on the 
importance of maintaining borrower control of the bank and not following the route of 
AfDB,21 which was founded by African countries but now has substantial shareholding by 
non-borrower members.  
 
Lastly, TDB recently created a new class of shares to bring in institutional, non-sovereign 
shareholders. The reform of the share structure in December 2012 — creating ‘A’ shares 
(for sovereign shareholders) and ‘B’ shares (for institutional shareholders) — was a means to 
channel new forms of capital into the bank, in particular reserves held by African financial 
institutions such as banks and pension funds. TDB first brought in an institutional 
shareholder (the AfDB) as far back as 1992, but in the four years from the Charter reform to 
the end of 2016, it has added 10 further institutions and about 26 per cent of TDB’s total 
paid-in capital (US$ 113.4 million). ‘We don’t have G7 donors coming in and giving us free 
taxpayer money, and we don’t have AAA callable capital either’, said TDB President 
Tadesse in an interview. ‘We know there’s a lot of African capital, and capital worldwide that 





 Oddly, Belarus has a small share of TDB equity, which TDB management explained as a result of 
Belarus’s desire to increase its export of farm machinery to Africa.  
20
 As will be discussed below, several OECD nations provide TDB with credit lines, which 
management views as a potential first step toward membership.  
21
 To address its financial difficulties, AfDB shareholders admitted new members from developed 
countries in 1982, which substantially weakened African control of the bank. Although African 
nations still hold a formal majority, the importance of donor resources for the AfDB’s concessional 
lending window and their support to the bank’s AAA bond rating give them de facto veto over many 
critical issues in AfDB governance. For more on this, see Mingst (1990: 54–60) and Strand (2001).  
22	Interview, Admasse Tadesse, TDB President, 16 May 2017.	
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In short, TDB has added more traditional equity investors into its ownership mix, the first 
time any MDB has done so in a concerted way.23 This is a creative way of working to 
overcome the financial challenges posed by a borrower-led MDB in Africa: offering TDB 
shareholders an actual financial return on their investment. Almost all MDBs are non-profit 
institutions — even if technically dividends are permitted, they are never distributed, and 
instead net income is used to build reserves or allocated for special purposes (Humphrey, 
2014). To satisfy these new shareholders, TDB must generate net income each year. At the 
margin, this slightly increases loan costs to borrowers, since this is the main variable with 
which TDB can increase net income.  
 
To reduce the impact of shareholder dividends on bank finances, a minimum 75 per cent of 
net income must go to reserves annually (or more, if TDB’s performance was weak) for the 
foreseeable future. TDB distributed about US$ 2.5 million to class B shareholders in 2015, 
which implied about a 5 per cent return.24 Although this is not particularly high (in a high 
interest rate environment such as Africa), Tadesse explained the logic: ‘If you look at public 
service pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, insurance funds, you can give them a value 
proposition with a twin purpose: make returns, because that’s your fiduciary duty, but you 
also impact development. It’s almost like impact investing, you start to give a purpose to 
funders’.25 
  
The cumulative impact of bringing in these three classes of new shareholders has been to 
strength TDB’s financial capacity and credit rating. Ratings agencies have noted the 
expansion as a positive development, with Moody’s stating in 2015, ‘Once new member 
countries join, the bank could lend in them, which would help diversify its loan book and 
further alleviate some of the geographic concentration. It would also bring new capital to the 
bank. Both diversification and additional capital are credit positive developments and would 




 CAF also has a group of private banks as shareholders, but their shareholding is relatively small.  
24
 Class A shareholders also receive dividends, but it must be reinvested in TDB capital until total 
paid-in capital reaches its authorized level (US$ 3 billion, compared to about US$ 1.5 billion 
subscribed currently). 
25
 Interview, Admasse Tadesse, TDB President, 16 May 2017. 
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The strategy of bringing in different classes of shareholders has some potential pitfalls for 
TDB. New borrower shareholders would seem like a clear positive for the bank, in terms of 
increasing shareholder capital and diversifying the loan portfolio. However, inviting non-
borrowers — particularly from major industrialized countries — brings with it the risk of 
changing the character of TDB and removing the strong sense of regional ownership. That 
may be a change that TDB would be willing to make, in the interests of obtaining more 
resources at a better cost, as AfDB chose to do and as the Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank (AIIB) has done more recently.26 But it also means that TDB would be much more 
beholden to the developmental agenda of wealthy countries, which would in turn strongly 
shape its operations. Non-sovereign shareholders can also reshape the bank, incentivizing it 
to generate greater revenue to pay dividends and diluting its official, multilateral character. 
This could, in turn, weaken the strong official links between TDB and member governments, 





TDB has followed several strategies in its lending operations that have allowed the bank to 
establish itself as a useful lender to its clients. The overall result is that TDB is much closer to 
a private financial institution than the larger MDBs, with a very strong focus on the ability of 
clients to repay and to manage the risks inherent in TDB’s loan portfolio. While all MDBs by 
necessity must be concerned with these issues, at TDB the balance between commercial and 
developmental criteria is weighted more strongly in favour of the former compared to other 
MDBs. As TDB’s Chief of Strategy put it, ‘Projects have to be commercially viable for us to 
support … the projects are seen individually and they are assessed on commercial terms. 
Even a public sector project has to be attached to a cash flow that has to be sustainable. 
Otherwise we are not handing money out’.28 
																																																								
26
 For a discussion of AIIB vs NDB governance arrangements and their potential impact on 
operations, see Humphrey (2015b).  
27
 Preferred creditor status is informal and demonstrated through a track record of repayment to an 
MDB even when a country may halt payments to other creditors. TDB does not release information 
on non-performing loans by sovereign vs non-sovereign borrowers, and as a result, the quality of its 
preferred creditor status cannot be verified. 
28




TDB faced a severe crisis in the late 1990s, particularly due to a very high level of non-
performing loans (nearing 40 per cent of the total portfolio). To put its portfolio on sounder 
footing, the bank undertook a series of measures to improve the way it evaluates project risk, 
including the creation of the Risk Management Unit in 2006. This means, as the current 
president put it, ‘saying no a lot’ to project requests, including those that come directly from 
shareholder governments.29 The stronger focus on risk since the early 2000s has led to a 
sharp drop in the NPL level, from over 20 per cent in 2005 of the portfolio to under 3 per cent 




The structure of the loan portfolio is also dramatically different at TDB compared to the 
larger, traditional MDBs. In particular, TDB has since the mid-2000s focused more than half 
of its loan portfolio on short-term trade finance, as opposed to long-term project loans. All 
MDBs engage in trade finance to a degree — particularly in the wake of the global financial 
crisis, when commercial trade finance for developing countries dried up — but it is usually a 
very small fraction of overall lending. At TDB, however, it represented nearly three-quarters 





This push into trade finance makes sense for TDB, for two main reasons. First, it matches 
TDB’s current ability to raise finance with the needs of its clients. Because it has only limited 
access to capital markets to raise resources, TDB has developed relationships with numerous 
commercial banks based in OECD countries. Funding terms from these banks are generally 
too expensive and short term for major infrastructure projects — countries instead prefer to 
access longer-term finance for these types of projects from the World Bank, AfDB or big 
bilateral funders like China. However, several TDB member governments regularly import 
large quantities of petroleum, fertilizer or other basic goods, and need financing to facilitate 
																																																								
29
 Interview, Admasse Tadesse, TDB President, 16 May 2017. 
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these purchases. The major MDBs don’t undertake this kind of transaction,30 but TDB is 
happy to step in. ‘We can access cheaper short-term money from European commercial 
banks than local corporates or sovereigns, because of our relationships with these banks’, 
according to a TDB trade finance officer, ‘so these transactions make sense for us and for our 
clients’.31  
 
Second, trade finance is generally much safer than project finance in terms of repayment, and 
it is much easier to structure transactions. ‘For infrastructure, the projects take long, the 
returns are not clear, there’s performance issues, and we aren’t an AAA multilateral so we 
can’t compete with the World Bank or Chinese’, said TDB’s strategy officer. ‘Trade is easier 
to do and you get your money back quickly’.32 The majority of trade transactions have a 
maturity of less than six months, meaning TDB’s money is recycled very quickly. Moreover, 
because trade transactions by definition have strong collateral (the goods being imported), 
TDB has considerable confidence that its exposure is well protected. Project processing is 
also much simpler, with few of the complications related to project feasibility, environmental 
and social impacts and procurement issues that come with infrastructure or social projects. 
For a bank like TDB, without a large staff of technical experts, this implies considerable 
administrative cost savings. Trade finance is a critical business line that builds the size and 
quality of TDB’s portfolio, generates substantial revenue, and strengthens relations with 
major banks and clients. ‘When we started with trade financing, that’s when the bank really 
started to grow and get noticed’, said former TDB President Gondwe in an interview.33  
 
TDB senior management stated in interviews that they intend to build up project financing 
going forward, but that doing so will be based on their ability to raise long-term funding at 
reasonable terms. Currently, most project finance is supported by 10–15 year lines of credit 
from major bilateral aid agencies that have agreements with TDB, such as France’s Agence 
Française de Développement and Germany’s development bank, KfW, as well as loans by 
export-import banks from the China, India and elsewhere.34 These offer longer terms and 
																																																								
30
 The major MDBs generally support only private sector trade financing.  
31
 Interview, Jima Mengistu Bediye, Head TDB ECA Finance, 15 May 2017. 
32
 Interview, Hamere Tefera, Head TDB Strategic Management, 15 May 2017. 
33
 Interview, Michael Gondwe, former TDB president, 22 February 2017. 
34
 See TDB’s 2016 annual financial statement, pp. 51–53, for a complete list of fund sources. 
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lower interest rates than TDB can currently get via bond issues, due to its sub-investment 
grade bond rating.35 In the meantime, trade finance is a critical business line that builds the 
size and quality of TDB’s portfolio, generates substantial revenue from fees and interest rates 
and strengthens relations with major banks and borrower clients. 
 
This use of trade finance to build the activities of the bank parallels the trajectory of CAF, 
another borrower-led MnDB: faced with difficulties in accessing finance and finding viable 
projects in the 1980s, CAF turned to trade finance to grow, with considerable success 
(Humphrey, 2016). TDB was created originally to finance regional integration projects, but 
just as CAF had experienced, TDB management found that most countries are more focused 
on domestic needs. ‘Regional integration projects sound very good, but it’s not easy to find 
governments willing to agree on borrowing jointly’, said former President Gondwe. ‘Luckily 
our shareholders understood this, and gave us the flexibility to move into trade finance’.36 
 
While these loan strategies have been successful in solidifying TDB finances and status with 
borrowers as a useful financial counterpart, they have significant potential downsides from 
the perspective of developmental effectiveness. It is unquestionably essential for TDB to 
improve the quality of its loan portfolio to establish itself as a reliable financial intermediary 
with creditors, and hence the focus on risk and project quality is justified. However, the tone 
of TDB staff interviews and reporting suggests that the bank may be overly focused on this 
issue and in danger of losing sight of its developmental purpose. This can lead staff to seek 
out projects that are low risk and with strong profit generation, which can crowd out local 
private sector lenders who might have also supported the project, but cannot compete with 
TDB’s financial terms. Similarly, trade finance may have some developmental impact, but it 
may also simply take the place of slightly higher-priced private sector finance, especially if 
the imports financed by these credits are simply consumption goods. The real test will be in 
the coming years: should TDB strengthen its bond rating and overall finances substantially 
and then begin to use that strength to transition to more developmentally oriented projects, 
																																																								
35
 Despite its disadvantages in terms of shareholder composition and region of operations, TDB’s 
bond market access has improved in recent years. The bank issued four times on the Eurobond market 
for increasing amounts and at improving financial terms. The most recent issue, US$ 700 million for 
five years, was priced at 5.275 per cent. 
36
 Interview, Michael Gondwe, former TDB president, 22 February 2017. 
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particularly by including clear non-commercial criteria into the loan approval process, then 
this strategy will have been justified from a developmental perspective. 
 
 
Reduced Hassle Factor and Operational Flexibility 
 
TDB’s governance control by African borrowing countries poses several challenges, but it 
also offers advantages. With shareholders relatively aligned in their interests, and with the 
non-borrower sovereigns and institutional shareholders in a minority position (and anyway 
supportive of borrower country goals), the types of policy conflicts that hamper the 
operations of the World Bank and main regional MDBs are non-existent at TDB. This is 
evident in the very low level of bureaucratic ‘hassle factor’ faced by borrowers compared to 
the major MDBs.  
 
In contrast to borrowing from private banks or issuing bonds, borrowing from MDBs often 
implies substantial extra time, paperwork and complicated, inflexible procedures that some 
countries view as an infringement on their sovereignty. Just getting a loan to final approval 
can take over a year on average (and longer for complex projects) at the World Bank, with 
another year or more before first disbursement (Figure 9). The reason is a long series of 
requirements imposed at the behest of major non-borrower shareholders related to project 
oversight, environmental and social safeguards, procurement and financial management, and 
development impact. To ensure compliance, non-borrower members have imposed relatively 
rigid, legalistic process requirements and review levels at the World Bank and at the major 




TDB does not keep detailed data on loan approval and disbursement times, making direct 
comparisons impossible, but it is clearly much quicker than the World Bank and major 
regional MDBs, and more in line with CAF’s processing times. Senior TDB management 
concurred that most loans take two to three months to prepare — even faster if the borrower 
has all necessary information ready — and the entire process from beginning to first 
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disbursement can happen in eight months or a year for most project loans, and faster for trade 
finance loans. As can be imagined, such prompt service is highly attractive to borrowers, and 
TDB is clearly aware of its importance as part of the bank’s value proposition, with senior 
staff mentioning it repeatedly in interviews as well as in annual reports.37 
 
TDB has three levels of review for each project, compared to four or more for the World 
Bank, and the amount of required information, time for circulation and number of staff 
involved are all much reduced compared to the major MDBs. On environmental, social and 
procurement issues — major areas of contention at the World Bank and regional MDBs — 
TDB mainly relies on a country’s own legal and regulatory systems, which greatly reduces 
required procedures, paperwork and time. Because of TDB’s use of credit lines from bilateral 
agencies, it generally seeks to ensure projects meet the International Financial Corporation’s 
Performance Standards, but it does so on a case-by-case basis, focusing on the specificities of 
each project. ‘There’s some countries that might not have these standards, but we are very 
picky about the projects’, said one TDB staffer. ‘We cannot impose external standards’.38 
 
Final board approval is also more streamlined at TDB compared to the major MDBs. 
Essentially, all projects are required to be formally approved by the executive board at the 
World Bank and regional MDBs. However, the executive board at TDB generally meets only 
four times a year, rather than sitting in permanent session as at the major MDBs; outside of 
those meetings TDB management has authority to move ahead with certain types of projects, 
which are subsequently ratified by the board during the next meeting. This type of authority 
delegation to management is also used by the borrower-led CAF, but is virtually unheard of 
at the major MDBs.39   
 
TDB staff have been empowered to support clients in ways that would likely raise difficulties 
with non-borrower shareholders at the major MDBs. For example, TDB is ready to 
																																																								
37
 See, for example, TDB’s Annual Report 2015, p. 8. 
38
 Interview, Neema Siwingwa, Principal TDB Project & Infrastructure Finance Officer, 15 May 
2017. 
39
 Interestingly, it seems that the new AIIB is following this borrower-led approach: the AIIB 
executive board does not sit in permanent session, and the AIIB president has authority to approve 
loans below a certain threshold.  
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restructure projects that are facing financial difficulties much more flexibly than at the World 
Bank, where project modifications often require another round of board approval. ‘If a client 
is a week or two late, we will work with them’, said one project officer. ‘It is not just a 
financial relationship; they are our shareholders’.40 Certain types of TDB loans might also be 
questioned at the larger MDBs. For example, TDB’s trade finance facilities for governments 
importing oil essentially serve as short-term budget support operations — that type of 
arrangement would be very difficult to get past the World Bank board, particularly without 
any of the policy conditions that normally come with its budget support loans. TDB has 
further supported governments by directly buying government bonds, a practice that larger 
MDBs do not engage in. This effectively serves as a loan to the governments via market 
channels.  
 
Here again, the advantages offered by borrower-led governance in permitting TDB to offer 
services attractive to its borrower members have potential trade-offs. While environmental 
and social safeguards, procurement requirements and project oversight procedures may lead 
to problems at the major MDBs — including excessive bureaucracy, infringement of 
borrower country sovereignty and imposing the views of a few powerful non-borrower 
countries — they also address serious issues that bedevil all development aid projects, and 
have contributed to raising quality standards. Taking a more flexible approach more aligned 
with the views of borrowers makes sense and can strengthen country ownership and internal 
systems. But it also runs considerable danger of lower quality standards, following 
inadequate local laws and ignoring serious social, environmental and transparency concerns. 
Not only can this lead to bad development outcomes, but it can also rebound on TDB through 
cancelled or delayed projects, repayment problems, particularly with private sector 
borrowers, and negative publicity for the institution. Should TDB follow a strategy of simply 
providing financing to borrowers with no concern for these issues, it may find that short-term 









MAIN FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
While the vast majority of academic literature examining multilateral development banks has 
focused on the World Bank and major regional MDBs, two dozen other MDBs are operating 
in the world today. Almost all these lesser-known MDBs are far smaller than their more 
famous institutional brethren. Moreover, almost all are controlled by the same countries that 
borrow from the banks — unlike the World Bank and regional MDBs, which are dominated 
by wealthy non-borrower countries. What challenges do these ‘minilateral’ development 
banks (MnDBs) face as a result of their membership and governance, and how might they 
grow to achieve greater success as development finance institutions? This question is 
particularly relevant in Africa, which has tremendous development finance needs, and is also 
home to more MnDBs (five) than any other region of the world.  
 
This article examined the Trade and Development Bank, an MnDB with 22 member 
countries, based in eastern and southern Africa. Founded in 1985, TDB initially performed 
very poorly, but since the early 2000s has begun growing dramatically. By using TDB as a 
case study, the article shed light on how governance arrangements impact the operational 
capacity of MDBs. This follows on earlier work by the author and others looking at the CAF, 
a borrower-led MnDB in Latin America that has expanded tremendously in the past two 
decades.  
 
TDB’s experience clearly demonstrates that borrower-led governance leads to substantial 
disadvantages for an MnDB in terms of access to finance. Compared to the World Bank, 
MnDBs have mainly developing countries as shareholders, limited shareholder capital and a 
highly concentrated and risky loan portfolio. All of this combines to weaken access of 
MnDBs to sources of finance, particularly capital markets, seriously hampering their ability 
to supply development finance at reasonable terms — their very raison d'être. Because of its 
shareholding structure, TDB has a low bond rating and limited access to capital markets, 
which means it offers loans at much higher interest rates and shorter maturities than the 




TDB’s limited access to finance is very similar to the challenges faced by CAF, but even 
more extreme because of the weaker economic situation of TDB’s shareholders and 
borrowers in Africa compared to counterparts in Latin America. The AAA-rated AfDB faced 
similar problems when it was first created in the 1960s as an entirely African-owned bank; 
resolving this issue was the main driver behind accepting OECD members in the early 1980s. 
This was also an important benefit of the AIIB’s recent success in attracting European 
countries as members — it has received an AAA bond rating (AIIB, 2017). By contrast, the 
New Development Bank (NDB), with only the five BRICS countries as shareholders, still has 
not received an international bond rating as of June 2018.  
 
By not taking the ‘easy’ route to better financial access of admitting wealthy country 
shareholders, TDB — like CAF before it and NDB currently — faces a difficult road to 
establishing itself as a useful financial intermediary for its members. Judging from its 
impressive growth in recent years, the strategies TDB has followed to overcome the inherent 
obstacles of its membership structure appear to be succeeding. Key components of this 
strategy include: 
o Expanding shareholding among regional borrower countries and creating a new class 
of shares to attract non-sovereign institutional shareholders 
o Focusing on risk management and the quality of the loan portfolio 
o Ramping up trade finance lending as a means to increase the loan portfolio with 
relatively low-risk transactions better suited to TDB’s financing access, which is too 
short-term and expensive for most infrastructure projects.  
o Providing a much more streamlined administration and faster loan approval processes 
compared to the major MDBs 
o Offering greater flexibility in dealing with client needs on a case-by-case basis, rather 
than requiring one-size-fits-all policies common at the major MDBs. 
 
Several if not all aspects of this strategy are only possible because of TDB’s governance 
arrangement. Having major industrialized countries as members is a tremendous help for an 
MDB’s access to finance, but has numerous downsides as well, from the point of view of 
borrower countries. The aspects of MDB policies that recipient countries most object to are 
the direct result of impositions by non-borrower nations, including high levels of 
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bureaucracy, time-consuming, rigid processes, environmental, social and procurement rules 
required above and beyond national laws, and financial policies favouring the interests of 
non-borrowers. By maintaining ownership control for borrowers, TDB and other MnDBs 
have much less conflictive decision-making processes and substantially greater flexibility to 
adapt to the needs of their borrowers. In many ways, borrower-led MnDBs like TDB are 
closer to a classic cooperative bank, without the ‘us and them’ dynamics of the larger MDBs.  
 
At the same time, aspects of TDB’s strategy to overcome the obstacles of being a borrower-
run MnDB have trade-offs that can limit its development effectiveness. The admission of 
institutional shareholders could lead to a greater focus on income generation, which could 
lead to higher loan prices for borrowers. A strong focus on reducing risks in the loan portfolio 
to improve TDB’s credit rating — limiting lending to projects that generate revenue and 
emphasizing trade finance — could lead to the bank becoming too ‘businesslike’, less 
interested in development impact and potentially crowding out the private sector. Reduced 
bureaucracy and faster loan approvals could lead to low-quality projects or unintended 
consequences, including social and environmental harm or corruption in procurement. In 
short, TDB must take care not to become so obsessed with improving its credit rating that it 
becomes, in practice, not much more than a commercial bank that happens to be owned by 
governments. TDB should follow its strategies in the near term to offset the limitations 
imposed by its governance arrangements, and in the medium term, as the bank builds its 
financial strength, transition to a greater emphasis on developmental outcomes. Otherwise, it 
may be in danger of using short-term strategies that ultimately undermine the TDB’s 
financial viability, reputation and developmental impact in the longer term. A critical point 
would be for TDB to begin instituting clear developmental criteria in its project selection as 
well as ex-post evaluations of projects — both of which appear to be lacking.  
 
Despite a relatively poor historical track record, MnDBs have substantial latent potential. 
This is clearly demonstrated by CAF — which now lends as much as the World Bank in its 
borrower countries — and the story of TDB provided here shows that such a successful 
transformation is possible even in a poorer region like Africa. Although still smaller than 
TDB, the West African Development Bank (BOAD) shows signs of moving in the same 
direction, with a growing portfolio, professionalized management and now a bond rating. The 
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challenge for these MnDBs is to find a strategy that addresses the (mainly financial) obstacles 
inherent in being owned by a group of borrower countries with little or no outside support, 
while still providing developmentally relevant services to their members. If they do not 
succeed, this borrower-led model of multilateral finance could result in MnDBs simply 
providing finance with little developmental value-added. The goal should be to evolve high 
standards and ambitious development outcome targets, but ones that are more in line with the 
values and vision of the developing countries themselves compared to the non-borrower 
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Table 1. Borrower-led MDBs in Africa 
 



















1976 13 93.7% 2,924 485 
Ecowas Bank for 
Investment and 
Development (EBID) 




1967 4 87% 381 184 
Central African States 
Development Bank 
(BDEAC) 
1975 9 51% 412 347 
 
Note: a Includes project loans, trade financing, guarantees and equity investments. 













































Source: 2015 annual reports for all MDBs 
	
 





















































































































Source: World Development Indicators; 
























































Note: Interest rate charges for TDB and AfDB are for combined private and public borrowers, while 
IBRD is for public borrowers only.  
Source: Annual financial statements, AfDB, TDB and World Bank (2010–15) 
 
 

































































































Source: Annual financial statements, TDB (2005–16) 
 
 




Notes: Investment projects only for World Bank; investment and budget support for others. Sovereign 
guarantee projects only except for AfDB, which is average of sovereign and non-sovereign 
operations. World Bank and AfDB average concessional and non-concessional; AsDB and IDB non-
concessional only.  
Sources: AsDB (2015); IDB (2015); World Bank (2015); AfDB personal communication; CAF 



















































Table A1. Multilateral Development Banks in Operation (2015) 
 














Africa      
African Development 
Bank (AfDB) 
1964 81 60.0% 35,131 6,061 
Trade and Development 
Bank (TDB) 




1976 13 93.7% 2,924 485 
Ecowas Bank for 
Investment and 
Development (EBID) 
1979 15 100% 767 129 
East Africa Development 
Bank (EADB) 
1967 4 87% 381 184 
Central African States 
Development Bank 
(BDEAC) 
1975 9 51% 412 347 
      
Middle East
c
      
Islamic Development 
Bank (IsDB) 
1975 57 100% 22,198 10,900 
Arab Bank for Economic 
Development in Africa 
(BADEA) 
1976 18 0% 4,269 410 
      
Americas      
Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB) 
1959 48 50.01% 111,139 10,404 
Development Bank of 
Latin America (CAF) 
1970 19 100% 32,470 12,255 
Central American Bank 
for Economic Integration 
(CABEI) 




1985 45 64.0% 1,505 346 
Caribbean Development 
Bank (CDB) 
1970 28 55.2% 1,407 294 
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FONPLATA 1974 5 100% 628 284 
      
Eastern Europe/ 
Central Asia 
     
Eurasian Development 
Bank (EDB) 
2006 6 100% 2,880 59 
Black Sea Trade and 
Development Bank 
(BSTDB) 
1999 11 100% 1,405 531 
International Investment 
Bank (IIB) 
1970 9 100% 882 186 
      
Europe      
European Investment 
Bank (EIB) 
1958 28 100% 621,973 102,426 
European Bank for 
Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) 
1991 65 13% 59,978 10,222 
Nordic Development 
Bank (NDB) 
1976 8 100% 29,769 3,085 
Council of Europe 
Development Bank 
(CEDB) 
1956 41 100% 27,376 2,508 
      
Asia      
Asian Development Bank 
(AsDB) 
1966 67 38.5% 117,697 13,416 
Pacific Islands Regional 
Development Bank 
(PIRDB) 
1989 8 100% 12 2 
Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB)d 
2016 52    
      
Global      
International Bank for 
Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD) 
1944 189 37.1% 343,225 23,528 
International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) 
1956 184 37.1% 87,548 10,539 
New Development Bank 
(NDB)d 
2016 5 100%   
 
Notes: Data are for 2015, except for IsDB, Ecowas and BDEAC, which are all from 2014. 
Only non-concessional lending windows are included, as concessional lending windows are 
technically trust funds managed by MDBs (although the World Bank’s IDA may soon qualify 
as it has recently received a bond rating to issue debt).  
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a The outstanding loan portfolio makes up a weighted average of 64% of assets for all MDBs, 
with a low of 20% (International Investment Bank) and a high of 92% (Pacific Islands 
Regional Development Bank). 
b Includes project loans, trade financing, guarantees and equity investments. 
c Neither IsDB nor BADEA are formally focused on the Middle East region, but the majority 
of their members are from the region.  
d Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and New Development Bank have only just begun 
operations and hence do not have meaningfully comparable data. Country eligibility for AIIB 
has not been clearly defined, hence voting power of borrower members could not be 
calculated. 
	
Sources: Annual reports and financial statements 
 
 
Table A2: Complete list of Interviews 
 
Abraham Byanyima TDB Treasurer 29 June 2017 
Eston Eston Chimkono Principal TDB Portfolio 
Management Officer 
16 May 2017 
Michael Gondwe Former TDB President (2001–
11) 
22 February 2017 
Mohamed Kalif Executive Director 
representing AfDB on TDB’s 
executive board 
16 February 2017 
Jima Mengistu Bediye Head, TDB ECA Finance 15 May 2017 
Neema Siwingwa Principal TDB Project & 
Infrastructure Finance Officer 
15 May 2017 
Admasse Tadesse TDB President 16 May 2017 
Hamere Tefera Head, TDB Strategic 
Management 
15 May 2017 
	
All interviews undertaken in TDB offices in Nairobi, Kenya, except for Michael Gondwe and 
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